"The authors offer a very different perspective on this campaign and are very frank in their assessment of the performance of the Allies and Germans on many levels." – New York Journal of Books
Wars never run according to plan, perhaps never more so than during the Italian campaign, 1943–45, where necessary coordination between the different armies added additional complexity to Allied plans. Errors in the strategies, tactics, the coalition tensions, and operations at campaign command level can clearly be seen in firsthand accounts of the period. This new account examines the Italian campaign, from Sicily to surrender in 1945, exploring the strategy, intentions, motives, plans, and deeds. It then offers a detailed insight into the five commanders who led the battles in Italy—the two British commanders, Montgomery and Alexander; two American, Patton and Clark; and the leading German commander, Field Marshal Kesselring.
Their personal notes and accounts, taken alongside archival material, provides some surprising conclusions—Montgomery was not quite the master of war he is portrayed as; Patton had serious flaws, exposed by wasting men’s lives to save a relative and overlooking the shooting of prisoners of war; Clark lost lives to bolster his image; Alexander the gentleman was far too vague to be effective as a senior leader. Meanwhile, condemned war criminal Kesselring appears to be the most efficient and also, like Alexander, one of the most popular leaders.
Preface Introduction
Western Allied Strategy German-Italian Strategy Operation Husky and Sicily Patton Italy Invaded Montgomery To Rome Mark Clark The D-Day Dodgers After Rome Alexander The End of the War In Italy Kesselring Conclusion
Bibliography Endnotes Index
Dr Andrew Sangster holds his doctorate in Modern European History as well as degrees in Law, Theology, History and English. He has written several biographies including Lord Alan Brooke, Beria, Franco, Göring, Goebbels, Himmler, a history of France 1936–46 and an account of the main European Secret Services before 1939.
Dr Pier Paolo Battistelli gained an MA degree in the University of Perugia, Italy, and was awarded a Ph.D. degree at the University of Padua, Italy, with a thesis on the German–Italian military partnership during WWII. Dr. Battistelli is active as a translator, a military history consultant, and author, publishing a number of books on different subjects of history related to WWII.
"The authors offer a very different perspective on this campaign and are very frank in their assessment of the performance of the Allies and Germans on many levels."
~New York Journal of Books
"...a well-researched work in which, by combining their research focus areas, two accomplished historians provide two sides of a story not often told together. The outcome is an enlightening work which highlights the impact human nature has on strategy."
~Aether: A Journal of Strategic Airpower & Spacepower
“…valuable in that it deals with the frustration, as opposed to the exhilaration, of modern military operations.”
~Journal of Military History
“Each general’s relative foibles are explored which gives a deeper understanding of their efforts during the war and helps to provide interesting backstory and other content which is likely missed or ignored.”
~The NYMAS Review
"...causes you to consider alternate options for the invasion of Sicily and Italy."
~Historical Miniatures Gaming Society
"...an iconoclastic study that is a remarkable work of seminal scholarship."
~Midwest Book Review
“… provides an insightful perspective into the human elements of military leadership during the Italian Campaign.”
~On Point: The Journal of Army History